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Sortition, its advocates and its critics: an empirical 
analysis of ci i en  and MP  support for random 
selection as a democratic reform proposal 
 
Abstract: The article explores the prospects of an increasingly debated democratic reform: 
assigning political offices by lot. While this idea is advocated by political theorists and 
politicians in favour of participatory and deliberative democracy, the article investigates to 
which extent citizens and MPs actually endorse different a a   . Thereby, we 
test for differences among  social status, disaffection with elections and political 
ideology. Our findings suggest that MPs appear currently largely opposed to sortitioning 
political offices when their decisions-making power is more than consultative, although leftist 
MPs tend to be in favour of mixed assemblies (involving elected and sortitioned members). 
Among citizens, random selection seems to appeal above all to disaffected individuals with a 
lower social status. If sortition was hence to be introduced in politics, a possible reform pattern 
would consist in a minority of politicians advocating for a reform that passes should sufficient 
civil society support be gained. 
 
Keywords: democratic innovation, sortition, random selection, deliberative democracy, 








Democracy is an ideal that is never fully attained in real-world politics and democratic regimes 
continually evolve in response to internal and external pressures. Calls for institutional 
transformation can take various forms, such as changing the electoral system, decentralizing 
authority or developing direct democratic tools (Bedock, 2017). Given that the transformation 
of democracy is not linear, some reform attempts succeed while others remain pure reflections. 
A crucial factor in this process is the degree of support from political elites and citizens 
(Renwick, 2010). 
This article focuses on an emerging democratic reform proposal that is increasingly 
debated in contemporary representative democracies: the assignment of political offices by lot. 
Until recently, this proposal could sound like a strange idea  a   was mainly 
known by historians of Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Manin, 1997). However, since the 
spread of deliberative democratic innovations in the 1990s (Smith, 2009; Jacquet and van der 
Does, 2020), an increasing number of scholars, activists and even elected representatives have 
called for the (re)introduction of random selection in contemporary politics. One of the most 
prominent proposals in this respect is to randomly select (some of the) members of legislative 
assemblies (Gastil and Wright, 2018; Zakaras, 2010). 
This echoes other democratic reform initiatives in representative democracies that aim 
at shifting political decision-making power from elites to citizens (Dalton et al., 2003). 
According to their proponents, the diversified profiles of this new type of representatives, as 
well as the absence of electoral commitments could narrow the gap between citizens and politics 
(Gastil and Wright, 2018). Despite these developments, one may wonder what the popular and 
political support for such a democratic reform actually is.  
The aim of this article is not to assess the normative merits of the sortition proposal but 
to empirically scrutinize its appeal for political elites and masses. Furthermore, we seek to 
uncover different factors that underlie the support for various models of this reform proposal. 
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In the absence of extensive scholarship on the support for sortition, we draw on the existing 
literature about other democratic reforms, including referenda. In this regard, we study the 
effect of three main variables: respo  status (the socioeconomic profile for citizens, the 
level of professionalization for MPs), their dissatisfaction with the current electoral system and 
their political ideology (left-wing vs. right-wing orientations). We conduct our research in 
Belgium, a country where the institutionalization of sortition has witnessed a growing debate. 
Our findings suggest that MPs appear currently largely opposed to sortitioning political 
offices when their decisions-making power is more than consultative, although leftist MPs tend 
to be in favour of mixed assemblies (involving elected and sortitioned members). Among 
citizens, random selection seems to appeal above all to disaffected citizens with a lower social 
status. 
In this article, we start by presenting the idea of sortition, its history and the issues it raises 
for the future of representative democracies. After developing our expectations regarding the 
factors that may explain c  a  MP  support for different uses of random selection in 
politics, we briefly describe the Belgian context and its relevance for the research. We then 
introduce the methodology of our study and present the main results of the analysis. We finish 
by discussing the implications of these results for the prospects of sortition as a democratic 
reform proposal. 
 
Analysing ci i en  and MP  support for the use of random selection in politics 
 
Selecting political officials by lot 
 
In the public arena, random selection can fulfil various functions. Allocating scarce goods (e.g. 
university admissions) and burdens (e.g. enlistment of people in military service). In this 
context, lotteries can be seen as a just procedure when it is important that bad reasons are kept 
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out of the decision  (Stone, 2011: vii). Drawing lots can also be used to assign public offices. 
The most famous contemporary illustration in this respect is the selection of jurors in the 
judicial system, but there have been other uses in the past. In Athens during the 4th century B.C., 
random selection was attached to the ideal of equality among citizens and was perceived as a 
more democratic selection procedure than voting (Manin, 1997). It was used to ensure rotation 
in offices and avoid the professionalization of politics. In some Italian republics during the 
Middle Ages, sortition was also practiced to prevent power from being concentrated in the 
hands of few factions and families (Manin, 1997). 
Random selection reappeared at the end of the 20th century with the development of 
deliberative democratic innovations known as - b c   such a  c  , 
consensus conferences and citizen assemblies (Grönlund et al., 2014). These forums gather lay 
citizens to discuss a political issue and make policy recommendations. The random selection of 
participants is supposed to increase the diversity of viewpoints and improve the quality of the 
deliberation (Landemore, 2013). Mini-publics have been organized in most representative 
democracies and can take various forms (Escobar and Elstub, 2017). These practical 
experiences have shown that, in well-designed settings, citizens are able to deliberate on 
complex issues and make meaningful policy proposals (Curato et al., 2017). This has led some 
to advocate for moving beyond the consultative use of citizen forums towards giving such 
assemblies real decision-making power. Concrete proposals have emerged in the United States 
(Callenbach and Phillips, 1985; Leib, 2010), in the United Kingdom (Barnett and Carty, 1998; 
Sutherland, 2008), in France (Sintomer, 2007) and for the European Union (Buchstein and 
Hein, 2009). Their arguments are diverse and located in different traditions, but they all share 
the willingness to reinvigorate representative democracy by empowering an assembly of 
randomly selected people. In the context of growing citizen disaffection towards politics, 
sortition is supposed to provide a better descriptive representation of the wider population than 
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current elected assemblies  especially in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, education and income 
(Zakaras, 2010). According to their advocates, this diversity of experiences as well as the 
absence of party affiliation should pave the way for fruitful deliberation that provides better 
policy outcomes (Gastil and Wright, 2018). 
However, these proposals are far from consensual and attract various criticisms. Some of 
these find echoes in the elitist conception of democracy, according to which most citizens lack 
both the willingness and capacity to discuss complex political issues (Achen and Bartels, 2016). 
Others defend the electoral principle itself and argue that if sortition was to replace elections, it 
would deprive citizens of the ability to express major political choices and to hold their 
representatives accountable (Pourtois, 2016). Others again highlight that random selection of 
representatives does not abolish   bb  a   c  public 
decisions (Umbers, 2018), or argue that because of citizens  inexperience and lack of 
knowledge of the discussed topics, a sortitioned assembly is more vulnerable to be captured by 
the bureaucracy in charge of informing and organizing the debates (Landa and Pevnick, 2020). 
Finally, some democratic theorists have suggested that giving binding powers to a sortitioned 
assembly could lead to the creation of a new type of elite that bypasses the deliberation of the 
broader public sphere (Lafont, 2019). In such circumstances, the reform would fail to involve 
the entire population in political discussion about the public good. These arguments point in 
different directions, but they show that sortition remains very much debated among scholars. 
This is also the case among political actors, especially professional politicians, as interviews 
with them quite bluntly reveal (Niessen, 2019; Schiffino et al., 2019; Jacquet et al., 2015). 
In the wake of these debates, we propose to study the actual support for such a reform 
proposal among both parliamentarians and citizens since they are the very actors whose support 
is needed for such a proposal to become reality. More specifically, we aim to research the 
factors that influence their support. Among the different potential uses of random selection in 
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contemporary politics, this article focuses on four commonly proposed models. The first and 
most discussed one consists in establishing a new randomly selected assembly in addition to 
the elected one (Gastil and Wright, 2018; Vandamme et al., 2018). This is a reinterpretation of 
the existing bicameral logic. Secondly, in light of the Irish Constitutional Convention organized 
between 2012 and 2014, it is possible to imagine a mixed chamber that is composed of both 
elected and randomly selected citizens (Suiter et al., 2016). Its aim is to create room for dialogue 
b  b    representatives who could exchange based on their different 
backgrounds. Thirdly, while the debate is often concerned with the national level, random 
selection could also be introduced in local assemblies. Finally, random selection is most 
commonly used in a consultative manner for composing deliberative citizen assemblies, so 
ca  - b c . 
 
Explaining support and opposition for sortition: Between status, electoral disaffection and 
ideology 
 
In addition to discovering overall tendencies, the research seeks to analyse the factors that 
influence the probability of citizens and MPs being supporters or opponents of sortition. In the 
absence of extensive scholarship on the matter, we base our expectations on previous work 
developed to analyse the support for other democratic reform proposals  especially the 
introduction of direct democratic tools (e.g. referendums, initiatives). Thereby, we consider the 
influence of three main factors: the status of actors, their disaffection towards the current 
system, and their ideology. 
(1) Status. We    a c   a   ca  ac  status   a notion whose 
meaning differs between both groups. With regard to citizens, we analyse the impact of their 
social status  operationalized through their level of income and education. This reflects a major 
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ongoing debate in the literature on the type of citizens that support democratic reforms that 
foster the participation of ordinary citizens in politics (Webb, 2013; Bengtsson and Mattila, 
2009; Bowler et al., 2007; Caluwaerts et al., 2017). On one side, some scholars indicate that the 
support for such reforms mainly comes from the most advantaged group of society (Dalton and 
Welzel, 2014). Following the logic of cognitive mobilization, they argue that citizens with a 
higher level of education develop higher democratic aspirations and endorse the idea that 
ordinary citizens should have a more important role in the political system (Norris, 2011). By 
doing so, citizens disregard traditional and hierarchical forms of participation and favour tools 
that associate citizens more directly with decision-making. On the other side, scholars argue 
that it is less-advantaged citizens who are attracted by democratic alternatives (Coffé and 
Michels, 2014; Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009) because they feel let-down by the actors of the 
current political systems (Neblo et al., 2010). A recent study on French citizens showed that 
those with more objective political resources (age, income, education) were less supportive of 
replacing elected politicians by sortitioned citizens (Bedock and Pilet, 2020). These contrary 
indications invite us to have competing expectations about the impact of c  social status 
on their probability of supporting sortition. 
With regard to MPs, we use the notion of status to refer to their degree of political 
professionalization. Thereby, we expect the use of sortition in politics to be supported above all 
by political newcomers since support for alternative modes of decision-making has been 
previously shown to come from less professionalized politicians (Niessen et al., 2019). This 
derives from the fact that politicians get socialized and strongly attached to their function the 
longer they are in office, especially at a parliamentary level. Politicians with a shorter political 
career, in turn, might have been less influenced by these factors and can hence be expected to 
be more supportive of the use of sortition in politics. We test the impact of professionalization 
on the support for sortition accordingly. 
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(2) Electoral disaffection. Secondly, we expect that both citizens and MPs who are 
satisfied with the current functioning of electoral democracy are more likely to oppose sortition. 
Since the proponents of random selection argue that it can counterbalance some of the 
pathologies of elected legislatures (in particular MP  a  b a   a  s of 
deliberation (Gastil and Wright, 2018)), one can reasonably think that the demand for a 
randomly selected assembly is connected to actors  a isfaction with the current functioning 
of representative institutions. Previous work has furthermore suggested that politically more 
dissatisfied citizens tend to support proposals that put    c  a  (Seyd et 
al., 2018; Neblo et al., 2010). Regarding MPs, while they are part of the electoral game, we still 
expect those who consider that it does not work well to be more supportive of alternative modes 
of democracy.  
(3) Ideology. Finally, we test the effect of  ca  ideology. We expect 
politicians from left-wing parties and citizens who vote for them to be more in favour of the 
use of sortition in politics since previous research has shown that leftist parties have a higher 
tendency to organize (Sintomer et al., 2016) and favour democratic reforms that give citizens a 
greater voice in political decision-making (Heinelt, 2013) (while some studies provide mixed 
results (Bowler et al., 2002)). Regarding citizens, we have the same expectation since existing 
research has shown that those voting for left-wing parties also tend to have higher support for 
direct democratic tools (Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009), and more generally, for participatory 
modes of decision-making (Webb, 2013). 
 
Belgium, a land of democratic innovations? 
 
We study the support for sortition among citizens and MPs in a country that has proven to be a 
fruitful ground for the development of democratic innovations in recent years, and where public 
debates on the topic are recurrent. Historically speaking, Belgium is not a place where one 
9 
 
would have most expected democratic innovations to develop because it has been characterized 
by structural societal cleavages since its creation in the 19th century. Yet, as a way to cope with 
its structural divisions, Belgium was one of the first countries to introduce the secret election 
ballot and the principle of compulsory voting in general elections. In the 21st century, Belgium 
is back at the forefront of democratic innovation when after organizing several citizen panels 
in the 2000s, the country saw one of the largest citizen-led deliberative experiments worldwide 
organized in reaction to the government crisis of 2010-2011: the G1000 (Caluwaerts and 
Reuchamps, 2018; Jacquet and Reuchamps, 2017). In the wake of these developments, the idea 
of deliberative democracy has grown within society. For instance, all federal and federated 
parliaments in Belgium have used mini-publics to foster their legislative process (Van damme 
et al., 2017). In 2019, the German-speaking Community (the smallest federal sub-state entity 
of the country) even went so far as to establish a permanent sortitioned citizen council that has 
the right to initiate citizens  assemblies whose results are presented to parliament (Niessen and 
Reuchamps, 2019). In the same year, the Brussels regional parliaments enacted the possibility 
to convene mixed parliamentary committees composed by both MPs and randomly selected 
citizens (Minsart and Jacquet, 2020; Reuchamps, 2020). 
In this ongoing debate about introducing deliberative elements in traditional 
representative institutions, the most frequently proposed idea has been to reform the Belgian 
Senate. Since its origins in 1830, Belgium has had a bicameral parliament with an upper 
chamber, the Senate, being progressively democratized  both with respect who could vote and 
who could be elected. In the wake of the advanced federalization of the state since the 1970s, 
the Senate has been transformed to a chamber of dialogue between the sub-state entities, and 
saw its powers being significantly reduced in 2014. In response to discussions about a potential 
abolition of the Senate, proposals were voiced to transform it into a sortitioned assembly. The 
promoters of the G1000 made this proposal and one of its most visible figures, the Belgian 
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writer David Van Reybrouck, refined the proposal in a book Against Elections  that was largely 
echoed in the public sphere (Van Reybrouck, 2016). 
More importantly, however, several elected politicians themselves have supported the 
idea  be it visible MPs or even former ministers. On the left, the Flemish socialist Peter 
Vanvelthoven and the Francophone socialists Laurette Onkelinx and Paul Magnette have made 
public proposals in this sense. The Francophone liberal Richard Miller and the Christian-
Democrat Hamza Fassi-Fihri from Brussels have given equal credit to the idea. Dutch- and 
French-speaking ecologists have made a joint proposal for introducing the use of sortition in 
parliamentary committees that they want to be composed of both elected and sortitioned 
representatives. At the local level, sortition has been used in several citizen panels. During the 
last local election, an increasing number of local lists advocated going further by randomly 
selecting municipal councils. Alternatively, the Francophone socialist Christie Morreale 
suggested to randomly select the part of the municipal council that corresponds to the share of 
blank (and possibly null) votes, instead of not taking them into account. 
Until today, none of these proposals has come to life and despite their increasing number, 
sortition is far from reaching unanimity in the Belgian public sphere. However, the ongoing 
political debate makes Belgium an interesting case for the opinions of citizens and MPs to be 
studied. While we are cautious with overgeneralizing the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the Belgian study, the ambition is to discover tendencies that can inform contexts and countries 
that would undergo similar developments. 
 
Data and method 
 
We collected original data from a sample of 1000 randomly selected Belgian citizens and from 
124 members of the Belgian federal and regional parliaments (MPs) in 2017. The data for 
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citizens was collected by the survey company iVox based on an online sample which was 
a  ba    gender, language, age and level of education (n = 1000, see 
Appendix 1 for the detailed distribution). For MPs, we collected data ourselves via online and 
paper questionnaires from June to August 2017. After sending out reminders, we achieved a 
response rate of 26% with a diversified distribution regarding gender, language and party 
affiliation (n = 124, see Appendix 1 for the detailed rates). In these two surveys, several 
questions were asked to assess c  a  MP    using sortition in politics and to 
capture several explanatory factors. To ensure comparability, the question wording was 
identical in both surveys. 
R     for sortition in politics was measured vis-à-vis the four 
previously mentioned models of random selection in politics. The measurement was made on 
five-point scales with the following wording: 
Q1 preamble: On the national level, it is sometimes discussed that that legislative chambers 
could be composed by random selection. Do you agree or disagree with the following 
propositions? 
 Q1a: The institution of a legislative chamber that is composed of randomly selected 
           citizens would be a good thing. 
[Fully agree, rather agree, neutral, rather disagree, fully disagree.] 
 Q1b: The institution of a mixed legislative chamber that is composed of both elected 
           and randomly selected citizens would be a good thing. 
[Fully agree, rather agree, neutral, rather disagree, fully disagree.] 
 
Q2 preamble: Proposals are sometimes made to adapt the functioning of local democracy. 
To what extent do you consider the following reforms to be desirable or undesirable  
independently of whether they have been introduced in your municipality? 
 Q2a: Composing the municipal council by random selection. 
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[Highly desirable, desirable, neutral, rather undesirable, highly undesirable.] 
 Q2b: Composing a participatory citizen panel by random selection. 
[Highly desirable, desirable, neutral, rather undesirable, highly undesirable.] 
 
Thereby, the main objective was to assess citizens  a  MP  support for the basic idea 
underlying the four different models. Consequently, we did not add questions concerning 
normative justifications, nor did we specify how they would operate since there are many 
different ways in which they could (depending on the selection procedures, deliberation rules, 
role of experts and formal power in the constitutional system).1 One can see that the first two 
uses are related to the national level, while the latter two are related to local use. Given that 
sortition has been used for composing citizen panels at various policy levels in Belgium, but 
never for composing a legislative chamber (mixed or not), nor for a municipal council, 
      c  a  ca  b  a  a  a   b c a  a a  
which the others can be evaluated. 
Different variables were created to capture the factors that we expected to explain 
c  b  a  c . W    a  c  a  a  
income (with three categories: < 2000 , 2000-4000 , > 4000 ) and their level of education 
(with three categories: secondary education, Bachelor diploma, Master diploma or more). As 
  MP  a ,  a  their degree of professionalization by summing up the years 
they served in federal, regional or local legislatures and executives. For electoral disaffection, 
both MPs and citizens were asked to indicate on a five-point scale to what extent they agreed 
a   a    b ca  a   a   a  a a . A   ,  
took the party to which MPs belonged and for which citizens had indicated they would vote if 
elections were to be held. On this basis, we distinguished leftist from other parties.2 We 
recorded  age (continuous for MPs and three categories for citizens) and gender 
(two categories) as control variables. While Appendix 2 provides a synthetic overview of the 
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measurement, use and directional expectations for all variables included in the analyses, 
Appendices 3 and 4 provide overviews on the distribution of the explanatory variables. 
In the analysis that follows, we first present MPs and citizens in-principle support for the 
different uses of sortition and compare their preferences for each of them. We then test 
differences in support (i) among citizens with ordered logistic regression analyses,3 and (ii) 
among elites with comparative descriptive statistics.4 To facilitate the interpretation and to 
ensure a sufficient number of responses in each category for solid ordered logits to be carried 
,  a a    a ab  (        ) 
into three categories (supporting  being neutral  opposing). 
 
MP  and ci i en  ppor  for he e of random elec ion in politics 
 
Aggregated opinions and preferred uses of sortition 
 
Our results suggest that the use of random selection in politics is received critically by both 
MPs and citizens when decision-making power is concerned and/or when it is the sole mode of 
designation. When comparing MP  a  c  -principle support for the different uses 




Figure 1. C  a  MP          
 
 
First, it appears that citizens are far less critical than MPs. Citizens have indeed a higher 
approval rate for all proposed uses  except for a sortitioned citizen panel where MPs score 
slightly higher (3.2%). Also, one should note that citizens have higher neutrality scores for each 
of the uses with almost a third of the respondents choosing the intermediate position. This 
suggests than an important number of citizens do not hold a firm position on the reform 
proposals. 
Secondly, a sortitioned municipal council receives by far the lowest approval and the 
highest opposition rates  from both citizens (51.4% are against) and MPs (89.5% are against). 
At first, this might be surprising when one considers that it corresponds to the lowest and least 
politicized level of ca   c   a   b  c   c . H ,   
at the same time be the very reason for why both citizens and MPs do not consider sortition to 
be a necessary democratic reform. Moreover, it is the political institution where sortition can 
be perceived as the most encompassing, i.e., whose composition would be perceived as solely 
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relying on sortition whereas a sortitioned and a mixed chamber could still be imagined in a 
bicameral setting. 
Thirdly, the mixed chamber is substantively preferred over an exclusively sortitioned 
chamber. While this is the case for both citizens and MPs, the latter remain comparably critical 
(66.7% are against). For citizens, however, it even gathers a relative majority of support (47.4 
being in favour, 27.4 being neutral). This is comparable to (and even slightly higher than) their 
support for a sortitioned citizen panel, which is noteworthy given that the latter has much less 
political power and has even had some real political experience in Belgium. 
Finally, another relative majority of support can be observed for elites on the use of 
sortition in citizen panels (48.2% are in favour, 10.7% are neutral). While we are talking about 
a body whose political decision-making power is at best consultative, it is still noteworthy when 
coming from political elites whose everyday job relies on a totally different rationale of 
decision-making. This can be expected to come, among other reasons, with the increasing use 
of such citizen panels in the last twenty years in Belgium. 
 
Who supports and who opposes sortition 
 
Knowing what citizens and MPs think of different uses of sortition at an aggregated level is one 
thing, delineating those who support and who oppose it is quite another. While making this 
distinction has been somewhat difficult for MPs due to the high opposition scores for two of 
the four uses (and hence little individual differences), some interesting differences exist among 
c  a . 
(1) Citizens. The results of the ordered logistic regression a a   c  , 
summarized in Table 1 ,  a  c  c a  a  a  c a  a c  
are statistically significantly associated with their opinion on the four uses of sortition. Their 
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ideology is associated with two of the four uses. The use of sortition in politics is above all 
opposed by citizens with a higher level of education and income. While education is negatively 
a c a   c    a  c a b  a  a  c a  c ncil 
with at least 95% confidence, their income is negatively associated with all four uses with at 
least 95% confidence. The fact that some associations are cancelled out in the joint models (i.e., 
model 5, 10, 15 and 20) is most probably due to collinearity between education and income.5 
The frequency plots in Appendix 5 confirm the association and show that higher levels of 
ca  a  c   c  a  c . C  c a  a c ,  
turn, has a robust negative association with their opinion on the four uses of sortition across all 
models and with at least 99.9% confidence. The more citizens are disaffected with elections, 
the more likely they are to support the introduction of sortition in politics. The boxplots in 
Appendix 6 confirm the association and provide further details on the distribution of the data. 
C     a , a ,   a c a      a  
chamber and a sortitioned citizen panel. The frequency plots in Appendix 6 confirm this but 
also show the limited magnitude of differences.6 A glance at the control variables shows that 
older citizens tend to be less likely to support the use of sortition in politics  at least for a mixed 
chamber, a sortitioned munici a  c c  a  a  c  a . R  , 









(2) MPs. When investigating the differences in support for sortition among MPs, one 
should keep in mind that the aggregated results (Figure 1) have previously highlighted limited 
variability in their opinion on a sortitioned chamber and the sortitioned municipal council, 
which almost all MPs opposed. Consequently, meaningful differences can only be observed for 
MPs attitudes towards a mixed chamber and a sortitioned citizen panel. 
The results of the descriptive statistics, summarized in Table 2 hereunder (see also 
Appendix 7 and 8), indicate tha   ca  c  ca  b  b  b  MP  
opinions on the different uses of sortition based on their degree of professionalization (even 
when one looks at it non-linearly, i.e., comparing the youngest and oldest MPs to the others). 
The sam  ca  b  a   MP    c a  a c   mainly because electoral 
disaffection is very low among MPs in general (see Appendix 4 for the distribution). The 
  a  MP  a    -right axis, however, appears to be associated  MP  
opinions on the different uses of sortition  most significantly with their opinion on a mixed 
chamber and a sortitioned citizen panel (the two others still having many opponents among both 
leftist and rightist MPs). Thereby, leftist MPs appear more likely to support (at least) these two 





Table 2. MP        b    a a , c a  a c  
and leftist parties compared to others 
Use of sortition 
Degree of 
support 
Professionalization Electoral disaffection Leftist vs. others 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Left (%) Others (%) 
Sortitioned Chamber 
Support 9.05 5.41 1.64 1.03 8.89 8.75 
Neutral 10.72 5.74 1.89 1.27 13.33 3.75 
Oppose 9.34 7.87 1.48 0.83 77.78 87.50 
Mixed Chamber 
Support 9.01 7.33 1.54 0.82 55.56 17.72 
Neutral 9.12 5.70 1.62 0.52 4.44 7.60 
Oppose 9.49 7.76 1.51 0.96 40.00 74.68 
Sortitioned Municipal 
Council 
Support 8.25 4.50 2.00 1.41 2.22 3.85 
Neutral 8.75 6.31 1.33 0.65 20 3.85 
Oppose 9.51 7.77 1.53 0.90 77.78 92.30 
Sortitioned Citizen Panel 
Support 9.01 7.12 1.51 0.83 75.56 39.74 
Neutral 11.17 10.03 1.33 0.49 8.89 14.11 
Oppose 9.72 7.06 1.64 1.08 15.55 46.15 
Notes on the distribution of the explanatory variables (see also Appendix 4): Professionalization: min. = 0.5, max. = 35.5, 
mean = 9.42, standard deviation = 7.52. Electoral disaffection: min. = 1, max. = 5, mean = 1.52, standard deviation = 0.89. 
Leftist parties vs. others: left = 45, others = 79. 
 
 
The prospects of sortition as a democratic reform 
 
These findings offer an interesting overview on the degree of support from citizens and MPs 
for four democratic reform proposals based on the idea of sortition. More importantly, they 
provide insights as to who among them tends to be in favour and those against. On this basis, 
we discuss in this section what are the political prospects of sortition being introduced as a 
democratic reform. 
In his analysis of electoral system change in representative democracies, Renwick (2010) 
distinguished between two main types of reform patterns: elite-majority imposition and 
elite-mass interaction. In the first pattern, a large majority of the elected representatives agree 
to introduce a democratic reform in order to advance their partisan or personal power interests. 
According to our findings, this pattern seems currently unlikely for the reforms studied in this 
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research. The first three variants of sortition  a sortitioned chamber, a mixed chamber and a 
sortitioned municipal council  are largely opposed by most Belgian political elites. In this 
respect, the proposals made by prominent political leaders that we presented at the beginning 
of the article are likely to receive only marginal support among their peers in the short term. A 
common way to explain this lies in the notion of institutional conservatism (Andeweg, 1989). 
Members of parliament are the winners of the electoral system and those who have the power 
in a given system tend to disregard alternatives that would weaken their position (Bowler et al., 
2006). That being said, there seems to be some openness towards sortitioned citizen panels, 
pointing to the possibility for the latter to multiply in the years to come  as long as they remain 
consultative. This is coherent with the recently observed spread of mini-publics organized by 
the different parliamentary assemblies of the country. While the Permanent Citizen Dialogue 
organized by the German-speaking Community and the mixed parliamentary committees in the 
Brussels region are the most far-reaching of these and illustrate the growing appeal for sortition 
in the eyes of the Belgian political elites, they too remain largely consultative. 
R c  (2010) second reform pattern suggests that a minority of politicians advocates 
for a reform that enjoys considerable support from civil society groups. If  a  pressure 
is sufficiently powerful, they can succeed in seeing their demand implemented. This can happen 
when the dissatisfaction towards a political system is strong and when some political actors 
portray the reform as a solution to its failure. An example of this would be the extension of 
voting rights in many countries, like in Belgium, where universal plural male suffrage was 
introduced in 1893 after intense protests from the labour movement (Mabille, 2011). Based on 
our findings, this pattern is already a little more likely for the sortition case, although several 
caveats apply. Our results indicate indeed a  c  support for the sortition reforms comes 
from those who are most disaffected with current electoral model and who have a lower level 
of income and education (in line with the recent results of Bedock and Pilet (2020) in France). 
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They would then be the societal group on which the reform had to be grounded. However, the 
second reform pattern suggests that political change only occurs if the supportive societal 
groups are able to generate sufficient political pressure (Renwick, 2010). In the current 
situation, these societal mobilizations in favour of sortition exist but remain relatively marginal. 
In recent years, several grassroots movements have campaigned for the transformation of the 
democratic model, including by further using random selection in politics  like the G1000, the 
AGORA movement in Brussels or local lists that competed in the 2018 municipal elections 
(Jacquet et al., 2020). However, it remains to be shown how much broader public support these 




In this article, we examined how the call for randomly selecting the members of political 
institutions or advisory bodies is received by both MPs and citizens in Belgium, a country where 
the use of deliberative citizen participation has already somewhat matured. Drawing on original 
survey data comprising the view of a representative sample of 1000 citizens and 124 MPs, we 
investigated their support for four different models of sortition: a sortitioned chamber, a mixed 
chamber, a sortitioned municipal council and a sortitioned citizen panel. 
Our results show that none of these models obtains an absolute majority of support  
neither from citizens nor from MPs. Relative majorities of support, however, exist among 
citizens for introducing a mixed chamber and among MPs for introducing sortitioned citizen 
panels. Among citizens, those disaffected with electoral democracy and those having a lower 
degree of education and income tend to be more likely to support the four different uses of 
sortition in politics. Those voting for leftist parties tend to be more likely to favour a mixed 
chamber and a sortitioned citizen panel. Leftist MPs tend to be less critical towards introducing 
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a mixed chamber and a sortitioned citizen panel than others. MP  degree of professionalization 
and electoral disaffection, in turn, does not seem to make substantial differences. The overly 
high opposition rates for all non-consultative uses are striking though, since realistic support 
seems currently only to exist for consultative citizen panels. 
That being said, despite their consultativeness, citizen panels start to raise a debate in the 
political sphere about how political decisions ought to be taken and by whom, thereby laying 
the ground for a broader debate on the topic. More generally, when looking at the prospects for 
democratic reforms based on sortition being introduced, one can see that a potential reform 
patterns would consist in a minority of politicians advocating a reform that enjoys enough 
support from civil society groups to be imposed on the political agenda. 
While the present study identified the groups of MPs and citizens most likely to take this 
role, it lies beyond its scope whether the necessary political support can and should be reached. 
More importantly, one should keep in mind that the objective of this survey was to grasp 
c  a  MP  -principle attitudes to the reform proposals. Consequently, no detailed 
specifications on the institutional design of the four uses of sortition, nor on the commonly used 
arguments in favour and against them were proposed in the survey. Together with the 
complexity of the topic and the relative novelty of the proposals, these may explain the high 
neutrality shares for some uses  especially among citizens  pointing to the fact that many 
opinions remain to be formed. Furthermore, while the  a   a   c  
a  MP  a  a      a  b  a c    ,  -
depth motivations for these attitudes remain yet to be discovered. 
Drawing on both these limitations and the overall lessons of the study, we want to 
highlight three avenues for further research. First, it would be interesting to investigate how 
information about sortition and c     c   . 
This would allow to study whether and how citizens and MPs might change their minds when 
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they were to know more about a certain concrete democratic reform proposal or if they had 
greater experience of existing uses of sortition. 
Secondly, experimental vignette studies could analyse whether different ways of 
implementing these reforms affects preferences for them. As with traditional elected 
assemblies, these new political institutions can be organized in various ways (in terms of 
selection, organization, control of the debate as well as the exact competencies) and further 
research could analyse if preferences for sortition depend on such institutional settings. This 
also echoes the most recent developments in political theory, where the debate has become less 
one on the merits of sortition in general than on how its connection with traditional 
representative institutions should be envisioned. For instance, even the scholars who are 
strongly against providing sortitioned assembly with authoritative policy-making power defend 
its use for spreading information in the public sphere or attracting attention on so far neglected 
perspectives (Lafont, 2019; Landa and Pevnick, 2020).  
Finally, it would be very interesting for qualitative research to further scrutinize why 
elites and masses support or oppose sortition reforms (see for instance, Jacquet, 2019; Niessen, 
2019). For instance, does the positive appraisal for random selection indicate a true fondness 
for the idea of sortition or rather a broad rejection of the current representative system? Would 
this then translate into a willingness to abandon or to complement existing electoral institutions? 
Conversely, it would be worth studying why some politicians support sortitioned legislative 
assemblies despite the risk of undermining their own legitimacy and power. 
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Appendix 1. Response rates for the MP survey 
 Sample Population Response rate 
Total 124 473 26 % 
Men 79 283 28 % 
Women 45 190 24 % 
Dutch-speakers 56 234 24 % 
French-speakers 56 214 26 % 
German-speakers 12 25 48 % 
Christian-democrats 29 85 34 % 
Greens 14 40 35 % 
Liberals 28 106 26 % 
Socialists 30 115 26 % 
Nationalists 13 87 15 % 






Appendix 2. Measurement, use and directional expectations for the variables included in the analyses 
Variable 
Citizens MPs 
Measurement Use Expectation Measurement Use Expectation 
Opinion on sortitioned chamber 3 categ. (based on 5) RV - 3 categ. (based on 5) RV - 
Opinion on mixed chamber 3 categ. (based on 5) RV - 3 categ. (based on 5) RV - 
Opinion on sortit. municipal council 3 categ. (based on 5) RV - 3 categ. (based on 5) RV - 
Opinion on sortitioned citizen panel 3 categ. (based on 5) RV - 3 categ. (based on 5) RV - 
Social status       
Political professionalization - - - continuous EV neg. rel. 
Education 3 categories EV neg. rel. - - - 
Income 3 categories EV neg. rel. - - - 
Electoral disaffection 5 categories (linear) EV pos. rel. 5 categories (linear) EV pos. rel. 
Leftist vs. other parties  2 categories EV pos. rel. 2 categories EV pos. rel. 
Age 3 categories control - - 
Gender 2 categories control - - 
* RV = response variables. EV = explanatory variable. 
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1 T    b    a a ,    c    c  (a  a    
likeliness to have heard about sortition) affects our results. We found that the significance of none of the studied 
variables was altered (either positively or negatively) and concluded that our model was robust. The calculations 
are reported in Online Appendix 1. 
2 We considered the socialist (sp.a, PS, SP), green (Groen, Ecolo) and far-left (PVdA, PTB) parties as leftist. 
3 To detect potential collinearity between the explanatory variables (social status, electoral disaffection and 
ideology), we built models gradually. 
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4 W    c c   c  a a   MP   b ca , a        
section, the number of observations in favour of several uses of sortition was too low and would have required a 
far larger sample size for carrying out solid logit analyses.  
5 Education and income were positively correlated with 99.9% confidence (calculated with an ordered logistic 
regression).  
6 T    b    a a ,    c  c a  a  a  ist vote had an 
ac  c . W   a  a  b  c    ca  a    (  a ca  
ca c ) a  a a  a  b  c    c  a    (  a ca  
significa c ). W     ac  c   c          
an ordered logistic regression analysis, none was found. We concluded that our models were robust. The 
calculations are provided in Online Appendix 2 and 3. 
7 Since the number of observations in some categories of the response variable were too limited for making solid 
tests of statistical certainty, we based our evaluation on the distribution of the descriptive statistics. In order to test 
the rob    a ,  c c     a a   a a c  (ANOVA)  MP    
professionalization and their electoral disaffection, respectively, and chi- a    c   MP  
leftist position. While doing so, we attract the attention of the reader to the violation of several statistical 
assumptions. The results of the ANOVAs confirm our interpretation (some experimental errors being non-
normally distributed (see Shapiro-Wilk test [SW]) and variances being unequal (see Bartlett-test [B])): Sortitioned 
Chamber ~ Professionalization: p = 0.75 (SW-p = 0.005, B-p = 0.26), Mixed Chamber ~ Professionalization: p = 
0.16 (SW-p = 0.04, B-p = 0.31), Sortitioned Municipal Council ~ Professionalization: p = 0.44 (SW-p = 0.007, B-
p = 0.08), Sortitioned Citizen Panel ~ Professionalization: p = 0.20 (SW-p = 0.06, B-p = 0.17), Sortitioned 
Chamber ~ Electoral Disaffection: p = 0.38 (SW-p = 3.9x10-15, B-p = 0.16), Mixed Chamber ~ Professionalization: 
p = 0.94 (SW-p = 5.1x10-16, B-p = 0.13), Sortitioned Municipal Council ~ Professionalization: p = 0.43 (SW-p = 
4.1x10-15, B-p = 0.20), Sortitioned Citizen Panel ~ Professionalization: p = 0.49 (SW-p = 1.5x10-14, B-p = 0.004). 
The chi-square tests equally confirm our interpretation (several categories not reaching the minimum of 5 cases): 
Sortitioned Chamber ~ Leftist Party: p = 0.13, Mixed Chamber ~ Leftist Party: p = 7.3x10-5, Sortitioned Municipal 
Council ~ Leftist Party: p = 0.01, Sortitioned Citizen Panel: p = 5x10-4. 
